Kindsight Protecting Mobile Subscribers solution now part of Alcatel Lucent

April 2, 2013 | Posted in News | By

Kindsight Protecting Mobile Subscribers solution has been acquired beginning of April by Alcatel Lucent to improve its capability with detection and remediation of mobile subscriber security problems.

Protecting Mobile Subscribers | Kindsight.

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O2 is terminating Ericsson CUD systems due to crashes

October 17, 2012 | Posted in News | By

O2 has said it its ripping out its Ericsson CUD systems after two failures caused loss of services to customers resulting in reputational and financial damage to the operator.

“(O2) CTO Derek McManus, writing on a company blog, said, “We are removing the Central User Database provided by one of our suppliers, which has suffered two different faults in the last few months. We are not prepared to risk this happening to our customers for a third time and are implementing a proven alternative solution.”  That central user database refers to the Ericsson-supplied database that was blamed by O2 for its July outage. ”


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Huawei routers cracked open. The best backdoor may be a plausible-looking vulnerability

October 11, 2012 | Posted in News | By

Felix “FX” Lindner from Recurity / Phenoelit has found many vulnerabilities into the Huawei low-end to middle-end routers.

Huawei’s problem? It ain’t the secret backdoors but wide-open front doors | David Akin’s On the Hill.

FX’s slides on Huawei routers vulnerabilities

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Huawei: Former Pentagon analyst says China has backdoors to 80% of telecoms

July 14, 2012 | Posted in News | By

Allegation that Huawei and ZTE have backdoors to enable chinese covert access to telecom infrastructure.

Former Pentagon analyst: China has backdoors to 80% of telecoms | ZDNet.

Huawei and ZTE deny backdoor allegations | The Inquirer.

The Secret Ways of Little Known Chinese Telecoms Giant Huawei | SPIEGEL ONLINE.

Huawei: worried about cyber-espionage backdoors? You can look at our code | Ars Technica.

The nightmare backdoor , reflections on the case Huawei | Security Affairs.

Huawei Initiating Int’l Network Security Standards | PR site

U.S. lawmakers to American companies: Don’t do business with Huawei or ZTE | Killer Apps.


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Pakistani-based telecom hacking gang aiming financial profit

February 9, 2012 | Posted in News | By

“Pakistani nationals Farhan Arshad and Noor Aziz Uddin, wanted for their alleged involvement in an international telecommunications hacking scheme. Between 2008 and 2012, the pair gained unauthorized access to business telephone systems, resulting in losses exceeding $50 million. Arshad and Uddin are part of an international criminal ring that the FBI believes extends into Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Spain, Singapore, Italy, Malaysia and elsewhere”.

via FBI adds five lawbreakers to Cyber Most Wanted list.

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GSM & UMTS MSRN (Mobile Roaming Numbers) information and frauds

December 4, 2011 | Posted in News | By

MSRN information and frauds from Humbug Labs

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Vodafone Femtocell hack

July 15, 2011 | Posted in News | By

The Hacker’s Choice has published details on how to use a Vodafone “Sure Signal” femtocell as a 3G phone interception point.


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The Athens Affair – Ericsson AXE10 Mobile MSC backdooring & spying

June 29, 2007 | Posted in News | By

“The prime minister of Greece was told that his cellphone was being bugged, as were those of the mayor of Athens and at least 100 other high-ranking dignitaries”.

“The victims were customers of Athens-based Vodafone-Panafon, generally known as Vodafone Greece.”

“Rogue software used the lawful wiretapping mechanisms of Vodafone’s digital switches to tap about 100 phones”.

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“Like most phone companies, Vodafone Greece uses the same kind of computer for both its mobile switching centers and its base station controllers—Ericsson’s AXE line of switches.”

“In AXE exchanges a remote-control equipment subsystem, or RES, carries out the phone tap by monitoring the speech and data streams of switched calls. It is a software subsystem typically used for setting up wiretaps, which only law officers are supposed to have access to. When the wiretapped phone makes a call, the RES copies the conversation into a second data stream and diverts that copy to a phone line used by law enforcement officials.

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Ericsson optionally provides an interception management system (IMS), through which lawful call intercepts are set up and managed. When a court order is presented to the phone company, its operators initiate an intercept by filling out a dialog box in the IMS software. The optional IMS in the operator interface and the RES in the exchange each contain a list of wiretaps: wiretap requests in the case of the IMS, actual taps in the RES. Only IMS-initiated wiretaps should be active in the RES, so a wiretap in the RES without a request for a tap in the IMS is a pretty good indicator that an unauthorized tap has occurred. An audit procedure can be used to find any discrepancies between them.”

“From time to time the intruders needed access to the rogue software to update the lists of monitored numbers and shadow phones. These activities had to be kept off all logs, while the software itself had to be invisible to the system administrators conducting routine maintenance activities. The intruders achieved all these objectives. They took advantage of the fact that the AXE allows new software to be installed without rebooting the system”

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“The investigators examined the dumps more thoroughly and found the rogue programs. What they found though, was in the form of executable code—in other words, code in the binary language that microprocessors directly execute. Executable code is what results when a software compiler turns source code—in the case of the AXE, programs written in the PLEX language—into the binary machine code that a computer processor executes. So the investigators painstakingly reconstructed an approximation of the original PLEX source files that the intruders developed. It turned out to be the equivalent of about 6500 lines of code, a surprisingly substantial piece of software.”

Source & More information: The Athens Affair – IEEE Spectrum.


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Room 641A: telecommunication interception facility operated by AT&T for the U.S. National Security Agency

October 31, 2006 | Posted in News | By

Room 641A: the scandal and lawsuit about a telecommunication interception facility operated by AT&T for the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA)

Room 641A: telecommunication interception facility operated by AT&T for the U.S. National Security Agency | Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.


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AT&T’s network crash reveals vulnerable nature of networks

May 4, 1998 | Posted in News | By


AT&T’s frame relay crash highlights vulnerable nature of data networks.

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